Kalman begins by tracing the history of legal scholarship sinc The central conundrum the realists and their successors bequeath liberals"-those who trust the courts to implement large-scale was how to keep their faith after the death of Earl Warren attacks from both the Left and the Right. The first four chapte are an accessible and enjoyable romp through legal realism, th school, the "law and" movement, hermeneutics, and the va scholarly fads that have entranced law professors over the y provides nice insights into the relationships between law an plines and tries, although not always successfully, to relate movements to legal liberalism and its travails. She is occasio especially when attributing malevolent motives to legal libera for example, that the crisis of legal liberalism in the 1980s migh triggered partly by the fear of "male academic lawyers ... that t women and people of color into their ranks challenged their con schools" (p. 94).
This part of the book accomplishes several important goals. It interesting and substantial history of modern legal scholarship. not in the best position to assess this particular contribution feeling a bit voyeuristic: I should disclose that my own work quite prominently, to somewhat mixed reviews from Kalman.) K good at this sort of history, and readers will come away understanding of the content and derivation of, and interre tween, the most important modern legal theories.
Even more important, however, is that Kalman's discussion of But a religious mission is not the same as a historical one, and therein lies the key to the sometimes strained relationships between lawyers and historians. As Kalman puts it, "historians ... favor context, change, and explanation," and lawyers "value text, continuity, and prescription" (p. 180). Historians "delight in recreating the past in all its strangeness" (p. 186). For lawyers, however-especially neorepublicans on a mission-history is to be mined for its usefulness, not explored for its own sake. Legal liberals needed republicanism as a tool in their war against conservative originalists, and could not afford the ambiguities, contradictions, and occasional distasteful results inherent in a truly historical approach to the Founders' thought. So, Kalman explains, "historians entered the fray to police their territory" (p. 163). This was not a difficult goal, for, as Kalman points out, "it is as easy to show that lawyers' legal history is ahistorical as it is to shoot fish in a barrel" (p. 179).
Had Kalman's analysis stopped here, it would have contributed significantly to our understanding of legal liberalism. Perhaps her greatest insight, however, is her recognition that this is not the end of the story. She quotes Mark Tushnet that "it is not a lot of fun watching people shoot fish in barrels;
indeed, one sometimes begins to develop sympathy both for the fish, who are doing the best they can in trying circumstances, and for their pursuers, who are doing the only thing they know how to do" (pp. 179-80). Kalman does in fact have great sympathy for both the lawyers and the historians, and seems to wish that each had a little more sympathy for the other.
She conveniently provides suggestions for deve thy. There is a difference, Kalman suggests, b 'public history' for nonacademic audiences" (in latter, while it should remain faithful to the goal less sophisticated, less ambiguous, and more should recognize that lawyers' legal history se historians' legal history, and thus may not Lawyers, on the other hand, must neverthel becoming "more sensitive to the varieties of hist She suggests a number of rules for responsible ing that "the public historian's conclusion sh scholar's" (p. 205). She offers as a cautionary e historian Alice Kessler-Harris, whose own scho testimony in a sex discrimination case.
One might generalize Kalman's sound advice t ans: never let your politics get in the way of you or academic. Indeed, the examples she gives of fa cases where a scholar was tripped up by an ov abuse) scholarship to achieve a particular poli mentioned by Kalman, the current controvers cist Martha Nussbaum's testimony in the suit homosexual constitutional amendment is anot testified that the Greeks did not disapprove of h rily on her translation of the Greek description While many experts give tolmema a negative con "enormity" or "shameless act," she testified that connation of "daring," and that "enormity" w to help invalidate a mean-spirited law later h United States Supreme Court-might have bee were questionable. She supported her testimony b edition of the authoritative Greek dictionary. "enormity" among the definitions of tolmema to use the older edition exclusively, it turns out t recent edition in her own scholarly work. Even i tolmema is more accurate than that of the lexico trying to finese the problematic entry.'
In the end, though, it is not clear whether Kalm historians to take her advice, because doing so In a puzzling final chapter called "Trading Plac historians are becoming more willing to accept yers are becoming more critical of ahistoric Founders' intent. One might expect Kalman t toward more responsible historical scholarship, but i deplore it: she concludes the book by noting that "it wou law professors desert the barricades just as academics in o historians, begin to show signs of appreciating what legal and wanting to help" (p. 246).
Perhaps she is merely troubled that lawyers have go longer recognize the need for "public" legal history note that "history can never do as much as law profe Unfortunately, however, her criticism of the liberal retr originalism is subject to misinterpretation. She se originalism primarily as a powerful tool against conser arguments over constitutional interpretation, she say everyone" (p. 238). It is tempting, therefore, to read her liberals' move away from originalism as inviting a p voluminous and sometimes contradictory writings in s the liberal position.
Would such an interpretation be misreading Kalma thoughtful analysis in most of the book, I believe tha herself advocates a careful, responsible, and pragmatist ap a limited value in such arguments from history; she wou distortions of Madison's ideas even in the service of legal afraid she is expecting too much from most lawyers. S what she recognizes as their most powerful weapon bu tion. Lawyers are, by training, disinclined to hold th lawyers on a quasi-religious mission are doubly likely urging them to (mis)use history for all it is worth. Despite this danger, however, Kalman's book will enl and historians. She notes that lawyers and historians h cross-purposes. Once historians scorned lawyers' attempts merely to understand, history; now, Kalman suggests, who are trying to be pragmatic, the law professors who (p. 229). Thus, having slid past one another without mana middle, they are still engaged in "their dialogue of th might remedy this deafness and provoke a serious an between historians and lawyers? I would suggest tha Kalman's book. It might help them understand one ano Suzanna Sherry, Law School, University of Minnesota, is postmodernism and law (forthcoming from Oxford Universit
